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THE SCHOLAR
"In my view, the border's been shortchanged for decades. In my view,
that is rank discrimination against Hispanics, institutionalized state
government discrimination against Hispanics."'
These words from Texas State Senator Elliot Shapleigh reflect the his-
torical trend of communities along the Texas-Mexico border, receiving
only the proverbial scraps of state assistance from the state legislature.2
Although there are various federal and state aid programs which provide
assistance, the pervading sentiment is that the border is not receiving its
full entitlement to government appropriations and that new aid should be
created to completely address those needs. This comment concerns itself
with the Medicaid Act and, more specifically, the manner in which the
State of Texas administrates the program. Currently, the federal program
aimed at alleviating the plight of the indigent is operated in such a way
that it perpetuates a disparate impact upon border cities.3 Texas counties
that operate with a budget shortfall are now left with the overwhelming
burden of supporting indigent patients who are incapable of securing pri-
vate healthcare coverage and have been denied the ability to rely on
Medicaid for necessary medical attention.4
Political rhetoric frequently pollutes the media with false promises of
hope for greater attention toward issues specifically affecting border com-
munities; however, change is never effectuated and the state legislators
always fall short of great expectations.5 For example, in January 2001,
immediately after succeeding George W. Bush as Governor for the State
of Texas, Governor Rick Perry remarked, "There is strong bipartisan rec-
1. Polly Ross Hughes, 78th Legislature; The Budget; Ok'd Bill Cuts Some Services;
Taxes Won't Rise, HOUSTON CHRON., June 2, 2003, at A13.
2. Id.; Community Mental Health Funding: Hearing Before the Tex. House Appropria-
tions Subcomm. on Health and Human Services, 78th Leg. (2003), http://www.epcounty.
com/CA/mhmrtest.htm (statement of Jose Rodriguez, El Paso County Attorney).
3. Diana Washington Valdez, Medicaid Rules Prompt Suit, EL PASO TIMES, Dec. 13,
2003, at B1 (arguing that tax payers will be forced to pay higher taxes to provide additional
funding to the hospital district given that absent preventive healthcare, the indigent sick
will be forced to seek medical services in the emergency room once their condition be-
comes severe); see also Medicaid Reimbursement: Hearing Before the Tex. Senate Comm.
on Health and Human Services, 77th Leg. (2001), http://www.epcounty.com/CA/health&
humanservcomit.htm (statement of Jose Rodriguez, El Paso County Attorney) ("Disparate
state funding forces tax increases upon an already burdened tax base and for the Medicaid
and CHIP populations., it perpetuates lack of access to health care and needed medical
facilities.").
4. Valdez, supra note 3; see also Op-Ed, Passing It On; Pay Now in Texas Budget or
Pay More Locally, HOUSTON CHRON., May 11, 2003, at Outlook2.
5. W. Gardner Selby, Promises for Border Not Fulfilled; House Leadership Blocks
$250 Million Plan as Legislature Winds Down, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, May 27,
2001, at Al.
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ognition that the border has real needs that must be addressed. There is
no better time than now to roll up our sleeves and get to work."6 That
year, there were numerous proposals to assist the border with transporta-
tion dollars, education dollars, healthcare dollars and other infrastructure
funding; the plans, however, never materialized.7 Instead, just the oppo-
site occurred when the governor spearheaded the proposed six percent
reduction for the 2003-2004 biennium Medicaid budget.8 Similarly, the
governor's thoughts as to the State Children's Health Insurance Program
("CHIP")9 have also changed."
The effect of that policy decision forces over 2.5 million Texans, the
number of individuals enrolled in the Medicaid program as of February
2004, to the brink of losing their benefits.'1 Medicaid recipients in Texas
are dependent upon physicians' discretion to provide medical services. 12
At the same time, the healthcare services industry is witnessing the flight
of doctors from the border to other, more affluent suburbs in Texas.' 3
Thus, Medicaid recipients living among the United States-Mexico border
communities are forced to endure the ramification of budgetary cuts to
an even greater extent than those living in non-border communities.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Gary Scharrer, Medicaid Cuts Could Harm El Paso Area, EL PASO TIMES, Feb. 17,
2003, at Al; Leigh Hooper, Doctors: Cutting Health Funds is Not the Answer; Slashing
Budgets Puts Burden on Hospitals, Group Argues, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 30, 2003, at
A25 (describing the House budget's approval of cutting 250,000 children from CHIP and
56,000 elderly and disabled persons under Medicaid); see also IAN HILL, STATE CASE
STUDY: MEDICAID AND THE 2003-05 BUDGET CRISIS - A LooK AT How TEX. RE-
SPONDED 2-3 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7324.cfm.
9. State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa (2000); see also
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 62.001 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (providing that
the purpose of CHIP is to subsidize health insurance for children of working-poor families
who cannot afford the cost of private health insurance providing preventive healthcare to
children who are not eligible for other aid).
10. Peggy Fikac, Perry Re-Thinks Kids' Coverage; He Says Cutting Them from CHIP
Won't Hurt Emergency Rooms, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, May 21, 2003, at A6 (citing
that Governor Perry no longer believes that cutting eligible CHIP recipients from the pro-
gram will lead them to the emergency room to seek medical attention).
11. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, TEXAS MEDICAID IN PERSPECTIVE 1-1
(5th ed. 2004), available at http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/Medicaid.
12. See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and
Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 201(1995) ("No state requires physicians,
as a condition of participation in Medicaid, to accept all enrollees who request care.").
13. Diana Washington Valdez, Thomason Sues State: Medicaid Reimbursement Rates
Are Target, EL PASO TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at Al.
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Admittedly, legislators intended for the Medicaid Act to provide indi-
gent persons adequate medical services.14 Unfortunately, the State of
Texas currently fails to administer the Act equitably across the state.
Physicians practicing in communities on the United States-Mexico border
and inner-city areas are reimbursed for medical services provided to
Medicaid recipients at a lower rate than those practicing in other areas of
Texas. 5 Compare the rate of reimbursement for delivery of a baby; on
average, a doctor in Houston receives $634 while a doctor in El Paso will
receive only $450 for the same medical procedure. 16 That is, the amount
of reimbursement is not dependent upon the medical procedure, but
rather the city in which the services were procured dictates the value of
the medical care. Consequently, this system has adversely affected the
Medicaid program so that Texans may or may not have readily-accessible
medical care. Instead of providing a reliable healthcare system, Texas
operates an inequitable assistance program.17
As stated above, due to the state's reimbursement schedule, physicians
are fleeing border communities to other areas in Texas where there are
lower numbers of Medicaid patients.'" As a direct consequence, the ex-
isting Medicaid patients have fewer numbers of physicians to provide
medical care. In El Paso alone, this exodus has produced results such
that the city "has sixty-one percent more patients per doctor than the
statewide average."19 If these physicians were equitably reimbursed by
the state, they would not relocate from underserved geographical areas.
Public policy decisions implementing Texas' Medicaid fee schedule
have caused the Texas Medical Association to issue a formal recommen-
dation to physicians that they limit their number of Medicaid patients in
order to avoid bankruptcy.20 Thus, public policy decisions which further
limit Medicaid spending, in effect, create a disincentive for physician-
providers to treat Medicaid beneficiaries because they will not be equita-
bly reimbursed for those services. Within the near future, patients will be
14. See Watson, supra note 12, at 195 (describing the history of "dual-track" medical
care in the United States).
15. Valdez, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. See Watson, supra note 12, at 198 (citing the fact that historically, inner cities and
rural areas have less access to Medicaid physicians, and those physicians who remain do so
under great strain to provide medical care to the uninsured and Medicaid patients).
18. Valdez, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. Luis Figueroa, Note, A Legal Analysis of the Texas Medicaid Reimbursement-
Scheme and its Effects on the Border Region, 9 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 62 (2003) (citing
Jim Yardley, A City Struggles to Provide Health Care Pledged by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
2001, at Al).
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refused preventive medical care from all healthcare providers who will
decline to participate in the Medicaid program.2 '
A problem exists in Texas. Texans are not receiving equitable medical
attention without regard to the city in which they live.22 Any inequitable
distribution of reimbursement rates violates the Medicaid Act, specifi-
cally section 1396a(a)(30)(A), which mandates that the state administrate
the program in an equitable manner that ensures that all Texans receive
their healthcare entitlements regardless of the location of their resi-
dence.2 3 A remedy must be implemented to cure this wrong. Although
physicians once had a recognized cause of action, the legislature repealed
the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act.24 Currently, physicians
have no such recognized cause of action against the state. Therefore,
Texas Medicaid recipients are left to defend themselves. Allowing physi-
cians to assert a claim on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the
Medicaid Act would provide for a legal remedy to this problem.
This comment advocates for the right of physicians to assert constitu-
tional rights on behalf of indigent patients in an action against the State
of Texas for equitable reimbursement rates under the Medicaid Act. Part
I of this comment explores the legislative intent and history of the Medi-
caid Act, in an attempt to understand its purpose in providing healthcare
coverage to the poor of the nation. Part II examines the current condi-
tion of healthcare coverage, both private and public, available within the
State of Texas. This assessment also delves into the extrinsic effects of an
existing populace living without healthcare coverage. The final section is
an analysis of previous legal attempts to secure equity in Medicaid. In
conclusion, this comment advocates for the right of physicians to invoke
the constitutional protection of Medicaid recipients who lack the re-
sources to assert those rights on their own behalf.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Medicaid Act was established by Congress in Title XIX of the So-
cial Security Amendments of 1965.25 The purpose of the Act was to pro-
21. See Watson, supra note 12, at 191 (arguing that physician self interest should be
used to condition access to middle-income patients as an inducement for physicians to treat
Medicaid beneficiaries).
22. See Community Mental Health Funding, supra at note 2 (giving testimony on the
heavy impact of disproportionately low reimbursement rates on the county health district).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2004).
24. See generally, Malcolm J. Harkins II, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Repeal of
the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal Responsibility to Assure that State Medicaid
Programs Pay for Cost Effective Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 159 (2001); Figueroa, supra note 20, at 70.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
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vide healthcare services to low-income persons.26 The benefits were
established as an entitlement program.27 The cooperative program is
"jointly financed by the federal and state governments;" the federal gov-
ernment provides matching funds to augment state government fund-
ing.28 Participation is voluntary, but once a state chooses to join, the Act
mandates strict compliance with its regulations for administering ser-
vices. 29 The participating state must submit a proposed plan for approval
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.3 ° The funding scheme
does not provide monies to the individual recipients. Instead, payments
are made directly to healthcare providers by the state through reimburse-
ment for medical services.3 ' That is, although the Medicaid recipients are
the beneficiaries of the Act, the physician-providers receive direct bene-
fits through state reimbursement.
The Medicaid Act has provided millions of poor and near-poor recipi-
ents with the opportunity to receive medical attention. Additionally, the
Medicaid Act has produced a dramatic economic benefit for the health-
care industry. In 2004, federal and state dollars combined to a total of
$305 billion and provided medical coverage for fifty-two million people.3 2
In that same year, funding of the Medicaid Program accounted for one-
fifth of all money spent on healthcare in the United States.33
While the federal government provides funding to the states for distri-
bution, federal law allows those states to establish their own rate of reim-
bursement.34 Therefore, the administration of the Medicaid Act varies
from state to state. For example, Texas joined the program in September
1967 and created a task-force under the Texas Department of Health and
Human Services Commission ("Commission") for the sole purpose of es-
tablishing such rate-setting methodologies.35 In Texas, the Commission is
charged with the responsibility of administering Medicaid to needy per-
sons who qualify for such aid.36 The problem being addressed in this
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
27. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND MEDICARE, MEDICARE & MEDICAID AT 40:
KEY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID STATISTICS 2004 6 (2005), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/40
years.cfm.
28. Public Health Medical Assistance Programs, 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2004).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
31. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0; Figueroa, supra note 20, at 57.
32. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND MEDICARE, supra note 27, at 2.
33. Id. at 8.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
35. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 531.0221 (Vernon 2004); see also, CAROL KEETON
STRAYHORN, TEXAS HEALTH CARE CLAIMS STUDY 1-8 (2003), http://www.window.state.tx.
us/specialrpt/hcc2003/96-787.pdf.
36. STRAYHORN, supra note 35, at 1-7.
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comment arises when the rates of reimbursement are inequitably distrib-
uted within the state. This problem originated when the Commission es-
tablished an inequitable method of determining rates of reimbursement.
The cause of action central to this comment is based on section
1396a(a)(30)(A) of the Medicaid Act. This section mandates equity in
the methodology of administering the Act.3 7 The section, amended by
Congress in 1989, requires a state to:
Provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of,
and the payment for, care and services available under the plan... as
may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such
care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under the
plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to
the general population in the geographic area.
This provision, known as the Equal Access Clause, has provided a suc-
cessful claim for Medicaid recipients to assert their rights under the Medi-
caid Act. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood39 acknowl-
edged that the Equal Access Clause of section 1396 provided a valid
cause of action for Medicaid beneficiaries.4n Therefore, a legal remedy
already exists. This comment builds upon the precedent established by
Evergreen. While other articles and comments discuss the search for a
legal remedy4 to address inequitable rates of reimbursement, the Medi-
caid Act itself explicitly provides a cause of action to pursue when seek-
ing enforcement of its policies. Therefore, this comment does not
advocate for the creation of a new cause of action. Instead, it suggests
that physician-plaintiffs utilize the Evergreen analysis to assert third-party
standing. Although the cause of action in Evergreen is apparently availa-
ble, a latent defect creates a very serious obstacle: the same beneficiaries
who lack resources to receive medical attention also lack the necessary
resources to reach the judiciary, making recovery unlikely, if not
impossible.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (stating service must be equally accessible to the
same extent that it is accessible to the general population in the same geographic area).
38. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
39. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000).
40. See generally Evergreen, 235 F.3d 908.
41. See generally Figueroa, supra note 20; Marlaina S. Freisthler, Comment, Unfet-
tered Discretion: Is Gonzaga University v. Doe a Constructive End to Enforcement of
Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Provisions?, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1379 (2003).
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A. Healthcare Insurance Coverage
Prior to addressing this problem with the Medicaid Act, it is important
to understand the underlying need for the healthcare entitlement pro-
gram. Studies demonstrate a direct correlation between socio-economic
status and healthcare insurance coverage.42 Specifically, when comparing
individuals by socio-economic status, persons with lower income are less
likely to have health insurance when compared to their higher-earning
counterparts. Statistical data also reflects a direct correlation between
healthcare insurance coverage and access to medical services. Thus, per-
sons with some form of health insurance, public or private, have higher
rates of receiving medical attention than those persons who lack any sort
of health insurance.43 Moreover, individuals without healthcare coverage
are "less likely to have a regular source of care, more likely to have
delayed or forgone needed care, and less likely to have seen a physician
during the year."41 That is, the uninsured receive less medical attention
than those that are underinsured, and to an even lesser degree when com-
pared to individuals with private health insurance.
Essentially, individuals with insurance have access to preventive care,
and are not forced to postpone treatment. Those individuals who do
postpone treatment will eventually be left with the only alternative: seek-
ing emergency medicine, undoubtedly the most expensive form of medi-
cal attention. Uninsured individuals are faced with "serious
consequences that increase their chances of preventable health problems,
disability and premature death., 45 Although it appears that the decision
to postpone treatment will only affect the health of the uninsured individ-
ual, the ramifications are far-reaching and the burden is spread to all peo-
ple across this nation.
This disturbing pattern of inequitable medical care access and utiliza-
tion poses serious, harmful consequences for the physical and fiscal
health of the nation. Dr. Fred Ciarochi, president of the Dallas County
Medical Society, issued a statement regarding the adverse effects upon
the health of society in relation to postponing medical treatment, stating
that "putting off the treatment of illnesses in early stages only increases
costs later, when diseases have grown more serious and must be ad-
42. See E. RICHARD BROWN, ROBERTA WYN & STEPHANIE TELEKI, DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH INSURANCE AND ACCESS TO CARE FOR RESIDENTS ACROSS U.S. CITIES (2000),
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/pubList.asp (examining access to health insurance
coverage in eighty-five metropolitan areas).
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id. at 19.
45. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MYTHS ABOUT THE UNIN-
SURED FACT SHEET 2 (2005), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7307.cfm.
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dressed."46 In the same article, Dr. Ciarochi highlighted the ramifications
upon local county budgets: "Every taxpayer ought to understand that re-
duced access has been shown to be a dangerously false economy in health
care."47 Reducing preventive care as a means to decrease budgetary
spending only shifts the financial burden onto the budgets of emergency
medicine.48 In other words, money spent on preventive healthcare
reduces the likelihood of people seeking more costly emergency medical
care in the future. Furthermore, the reverse is also true; the less the state
spends to keep a healthy population, the more it will spend on its popu-
lace at its emergency rooms across the nation.
Survey research involving national data compilation is not without its
errors, but a careful analysis allows for reporting with the caution that the
reader needs to have an understanding of the results. For example, the
United States Census Bureau conducts numerous different surveys, one
of which involves healthcare coverage for the population. However, the
Census Bureau recognizes the intricacies and shortcomings of different
types of surveys conducted. To remedy the discrepancies in information,
a report was issued that compared two separate studies: "People with
Health Insurance: A Comparison of Estimates from Two Surveys.
4 9
That report examined the data collected through the Current Population
Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) and the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In order to find the
most accurate representation of the population size living with some form
of health coverage, the report examined and compared the two Census
surveys, looked at the similarities and differences in the times covered
during each year, and lastly, took into account the sample number of par-
ticipants.5" It is important to note that the data results reflecting gov-
ernment-based healthcare coverage tended to be more accurate than
those demonstrating private coverage.51
Medicaid serves as a safety net for individuals without private health-
care coverage. For the year 2001, the Census Bureau reported that
slightly more than twenty-five percent of the nation's population was cov-
46. Fred Ciarochi, Letter to the Editor, Parkland Budget; County Must Approve Tax
Rate Increase to Safeguard Community's Health, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 2000, at
J6.
47. Id. (Dr. Ciarochi, president of the Dallas County Medical Society issued this state-
ment as a plea to increase the tax base to prevent the closing of Parkland's primary-care
clinics serving medically underserved neighborhoods).
48. Id.
49. Shailesh Bhandari, People with Health Insurance: A Comparison of Estimates
from Two Surveys, at 3 (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Publ'n No. 243,
2004), available at http://www.census.govlhhes/wwwlhlthins/reports.html.
50. Id. at 3-7.
51. Id. at 8.
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ered by public health insurance.52 In 2003, 15.2 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation, nearly 43.6 million people, were without any form of healthcare
coverage.53 In 2002, 25.8 percent of the State of Texas's population, 5.6
million people, had no health insurance coverage, ranking first in the na-
tion of citizens without health insurance.54 A total of 3.2 million Texans
received coverage through Medicaid; of those, fifty-nine percent were
children. 5 Unfortunately, the indigent children of this nation are those
most regularly being deprived of healthcare due to budgetary
constraints.56
B. Relationship with the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
This comment cannot discuss Medicaid without mentioning and briefly
explaining the CHIP program. In 1997, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1397aa to address the need of insuring the children of working poor
families.57 The similarities between the Medicaid Act and CHIP has lead
Congress to treat the two as a single issue with respect to appropriation
committees. Moreover, it is common practice for reports to combine re-
search efforts and publish a single report on both programs. Therefore,
discussion of Medicaid financing implicitly involves funding for CHIP.
Specifically, section 1397aa(a) of the CHIP statute mandates the provi-
sion of financial assistance by either coverage through 1397cc, or "provid-
ing benefits under the State's Medicaid plan," or a combination of both.58
C. The Current State of Texas
Federal financing for the Medicaid program varies from state to state,
ranging from between the maximum eighty-three percent and the mini-
mum fifty percent coverage of program costs.59 In the 2002 fiscal year,
Texas was responsible for 39.8 percent while the federal government pro-
52. Id.
53. ROBIN A. COHEN & ZAKIA CORIATY-NELSON, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Sta-
tistics, Ctr. for Disease Control, 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm.
54. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, supra note 11, at 2-4, Cover-3.
55. Id. at 1-2.
56. Shailesh Bhandari & Elizabeth Gifford, Children with Health Insurance: 2001, at 5
(U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Publ'n No 60-224, 2003), available at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/reports.html.
57. State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa (2004) ("The
purpose of this subchapter is to provide funds to States to enable them to initiate and
expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in an
effective and efficient manner that is coordinated with other sources of health coverage
benefits for children.").
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa(a)(2).
59. STRAYHORN, supra note 34, at 1-8.
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vided 60.2 percent of the total funding for Texas's Medicaid program.6" It
is estimated that the total funding for 2002 was $13.7 billion.61
Because the Medicaid Act is an entitlement program, neither the fed-
eral nor the state government can limit the enrollment numbers "or the
amount of money available for services.",62 Once an eligible person has
enrolled, the state must expend the monies to cover that person's medical
costs. Therefore, any effort to increase enrollment carries with it the bur-
den to appropriate more funds. Unanticipated success of the program's
enrollment efforts exceeded budgetary expectations and thus created a
budget shortfall.63 The state did not allocate sufficient funds to cover the
actual number of eligible persons for public health insurance, but rather
only appropriated funds for an estimated percentage of eligible benefi-
ciaries who were likely to enroll in the program.64 Ultimately, the state
budget shortfall forced the state legislature to implement cost-saving
policies.65
Estimates by the State Comptroller predicted a shortfall of $9.9 billion
for the state of Texas alone.6 6 As a result, Texas's total spending for
Medicaid and CHIP was drastically reduced for the fiscal year biennium
budget 2004-2005 by more than $1.6 billion. 67 At least one report indi-
cates that the dilemma between saving governmental monies and provid-
ing adequate appropriations for Medicaid and CHIP is exacerbated
because of the operational structure68 of the Texas legislature.69 In na-
tional comparison, Texas has the lowest rate of employer-sponsored cov-
erage. Therefore, Texas's uninsured are even more dependent upon
Medicaid/CHIP for preventive and primary healthcare services than un-
insured residents of other states. 70 Even though uninsured residents in
Texas had few, if any, alternatives for seeking out health coverage, the
subsequent budget cuts included a decrease in the provider reimburse-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. HILL, supra note 8, at 2.
64. Op-Ed, CHIP Cuts; Health Benefits for Working Poor Shouldn't be Secret, Hous-
TON CHRON., June 8, 2004, at A22.
65. HILL, supra note 8, at 2.
66. Id. at 3.
67. ANNE DUNKELBERG & MOLLEY O'MALLEY, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, CHILDREN'S MEDICAID AND SCHIP IN TEXAS: TRACKING THE IMPACT
OF BUDGET CUTS 1 (2004), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/index.cfm.
68. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5 (requiring that the Legislature meet every two years at
such time as may be provided by law and at other times when convened by the Governor).
69. HILL, supra note 8, at 2.
70. DUNKELBERG & O'MALLEY, supra note 67.
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ment rates. Doctors and hospitals received a 2.5 percent reduction for
fiscal year 2004.71
D. Reimbursement to Providers
There are "four main healthcare delivery programs" through which
Texas Medicaid funding is distributed to physicians: "fee-for-service,
managed care services, long term care services and reimbursements to
hospitals serving a disproportionate share of low-income persons. "72
Providers are allowed to participate in the program and enroll according
to eligibility requirements set by the Claims Administrator, NHIC.73 This
comment addresses the fee-for-service, managed care, and reimburse-
ment-to-hospitals methods for delivering medical attention.
Disparities within the program have not gone unnoticed. The State of
Texas commissioned the Health and Human Services Commission to es-
tablish the Border Rate Workgroup in 2000, to issue recommendations
for alleviating problematic areas within the program.7 4 The workgroup
concluded and reported its findings in mid-December 2000. The nine-
member workgroup made numerous findings and recommendations.
Specifically, the report focused on the low number of healthcare provid-
ers along the border area, "the effect of access on utilization and the capi-
tation rate methodologies," as well as the reimbursement rates for
physicians.75
First, the workgroup took issue with the rate methodology used by the
state. Specifically, the workgroup noted that the statewide plan failed to
"recognize the unique and different health care issues in the border ar-
eas."7 6 Next, the workgroup noted that the border area suffers from a
"disproportionately low number of health care providers including pri-
mary care physicians, specialists, registered nurses, pharmacists," and, as
a direct result, negatively "impacts recipients' access to services, and con-
sequently, the utilization of services."7 7 Likewise, the report finds a di-
71. Id.
72. STRAYHORN, supra note 35, at 1-8.
73. Id. (articulating that there are four contractors that provide support and opera-
tional functions for the Texas Medicaid Administrative System. The National Heritage
Insurance Company (NHIC) is the current claims administrator which processes Medicaid
claims not processed under an arrangement between the state and health maintenance
organizations).
74. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, BORDER RATE WORKGROUP FINAL
REPORT ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 1 (2000) (on file with author).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 1-2.
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rect relationship between low reimbursement for Medicaid physicians
and their decision to avoid practicing medicine in the border region.
7 8
The inequities reviewed by the Border Rate Workgroup were ad-
dressed and several recommendations were made to improve indigent ac-
cess to healthcare. The workgroup identified a sixteen percent disparity
in the fee-for-service 9 methodology of the program, and recommended a
sixteen percent increase to cover that disparity.8 ° Likewise, the work-
group suggested an additional ten percent increase specifically patterned
after Medicare incentives to physicians who relocate to underserved
areas.
8 1
Administration of the Medicaid Act has revealed inequities in the man-
ner in which indigent patients are able to receive medical care. The fact
that a commission issued the report exposing problematic areas within
the program amounts to an acknowledgement on behalf of the state that
it is unwilling to make critically-needed changes through the legislative
process. Therefore, in keeping with the legislative intent of the Medicaid
Act, recipients are left with utilizing the judiciary to enforce the equitable
provisions of the Act.
II. HISTORY
Eligibility for Medicaid was initially linked to welfare, 2 in that enroll-
ment was limited to those individuals already receiving aid through the
current system of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)"3
and of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 4 program. 5 However,
during the 1980s, Congress expanded enrollment eligibility to individuals
who did not qualify for TANF or SSI.86 The effects of that expansion
were significant in allowing low-income individuals, pregnant mothers,
and children, among others, access to previously unavailable medical ser-
78. Id. at 2.
79. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, supra note 11, at Gl1 ("The tradi-
tional health care payment system, under which physicians and other providers receive a
payment for each unit of service they provide.").
80. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, supra note 74, at 7-8.
81. Id. at 8.
82. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, supra note 11, at 1-1.
83. Id. at 1-1, G1, G27 (TANF is the federal-state cash assistance program for impov-
erished families, formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
Children who qualify for TANF are also eligible for benefits under Medicaid).
84. Id. at G27 ("Supplemental Security Income SSI is a federal program which pro-
vides cash assistance to the elderly and disabled poor. It is administered by the Social
Security Administration. SSI eligible beneficiaries are automatically eligible for Medicaid
benefits in Texas.").
85. Id. at G1, G27.
86. Id. at 1-1; KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND MEDICARE, supra note 27, at 2.
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vices. Unfortunately, the increased enrollment into the program had a
negative impact on government finance. As more individuals became eli-
gible to receive aid, state governments, prohibited from refusing coverage
to eligible beneficiaries, were required to increase budgetary allocations.
Recently, and despite the program's success, the Texas legislature enacted
additional administrative enrollment procedures in an effort to decrease
the rate at which eligible individuals are accepted into the program. In
2004, the State Comptroller of Texas, Carole Keeton Strayhorn, recom-
mended and implemented the re-enrollment process for eligibility at six
month intervals.8 7
The Texas legislature now requires continual re-enrollment of eligible
recipients every six months as opposed to every year, and further delays
coverage benefits to enrollees for a period of ninety days after initial en-
rollment.88 As a result, initial enrollees will not receive any medical at-
tention for three months and immediately thereafter, are required to re-
enroll every six months thereafter.
In addition, passage of House Bill 2292 in 2003 by the Texas Legisla-
ture modified the enrollment form itself as yet another means to discour-
age program participation. A description by one journalist described the
bill as a deliberate attempt to make the enrollment process "unnecessa-
rily complex."89 Additionally, the legislation revoked funding for the
publicity of the program, effectively hiding the program from the public's
attention.90 The legislature has implemented a difficult enrollment pro-
cess and requires eligible low-income families to re-qualify with that form
every six months while simultaneously reducing efforts to educate the
public that the program exists.
The effects of these decisions are undeniable. Within the first month,
6,414 children were dropped from CHIP enrollment, and the decline has
continued every month since HB 2292 took effect.91 As of May 2004, the
total state enrollment dropped from 529,211 children to 365,731.92 Yet,
even more startling is the legislature's intent to reduce that number even
further. The 2005 budget approved by the legislature will only serve an
estimated 347,000 children.93 It is a sad fact that the Texas Legislature is
87. Robert T. Garrett, Comptroller's Saving Plan: 'Leaner... Not Meaner' Budget
Multistate Lottery Pushed; Critics Say Health Cuts Go Too Far, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jan. 11, 2003, at Al; DUNKELBERG & O'MALLEY, supra note 67, at 1.
88. DUNKELBERG & O'MALLEY, supra note 67, at 1.
89. Carlos Guerra, Op-Ed, Making People Suffer Goes Beyond Living Within Our
Means, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, May 25, 2004, at B1.
90. Op-Ed, supra note 64.
91. Guerra, supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. Op-Ed, supra note 64.
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so willing to deny the children of low-income families medical attention,
particularly when the actual cost of the program is so heavily subsidized
by the federal government. The federal government contributes seventy-
five percent of the costs of the program, leaving the State of Texas ac-
countable for only twenty-five percent of CHIP funding.94 By reducing
the portion of the state's share of appropriations, the legislature is suc-
cessfully leaving federal funds at the table.
The state representatives who originally drafted legislation making the
enrollment process more convenient for indigent clients, argue that elimi-
nating services to those who need them most will have significant ramifi-
cations. State Representative Garnet Coleman specifically noted that
extended enrollment verification forms place the greatest impact upon
the indigent children of the state.95 While the majority of individual ben-
eficiaries under Medicaid are children, state expenditures on their medi-
cal costs consist of only twenty-five percent of the overall Medicaid
budget.96
Dramatic increases in enrollment also affect healthcare providers. For
those healthcare providers located in traditionally, economically-disad-
vantaged areas, the increased enrollment only exacerbated an already-
challenging medical practice. It is unreasonable to expect physician-prov-
iders to continue to provide medical assistance and remain in the Medi-
caid program when their costs are exceeding their reimbursement
payments.
Healthcare providers are able to maintain successful practices only
with good business plans. Essential to that plan are private-pay patients
who can afford to pay for medical services. It is critical for providers to
have a payor-mix that can sustain their business and avoid bankruptcy.
Regardless of the healthcare coverage's status as public or private, physi-
cian-providers who are not adequately reimbursed for the services they
provide will eventually be forced out of business. Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that many doctors have specifically refused to participate in the Medi-
caid program.97 One estimate indicates that one-fourth of the nation's
physicians refuse to treat Medicaid recipients.98 Within Texas, some phy-
sicians have announced they no longer accept Medicaid patients, CHIP
patients, and even certain private healthcare coverage, primarily because
of financial strain.
94. Id.
95. Garrett, supra note 87.
96. STRAYHoRN, supra note 35, at 1-10.
97. Watson, supra note 12, at 191.
98. Id. at 193.
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Texas Governor Rick Perry acknowledged the hardship placed upon
physicians by the untimely reimbursement rates of private sector insur-
ance companies. Legislation was passed to enforce penalties to private
insurance companies who failed to timely reimburse physicians. Gover-
nor Perry must now acknowledge the hardships placed upon those physi-
cians whose primary clientele is made up of indigent Medicaid recipients.
A. Payor-mix and Provider Shortage
Providers are refusing to treat Medicaid patients because the rates of
reimbursement are not sufficient to cover the rising costs of providing
services. However, some providers have been able to sustain their prac-
tice by simultaneously providing care to patients who can afford to pay
their medical bills, either through private insurance or out of pocket.
Therefore, it is essential to have an adequate ratio of public and private
patients. This ratio is known as the payor-mix.
Texas averages a payor-mix consisting of ten percent Medicaid, and
nearly sixty-five percent private insurance coverage, leaving nearly
twenty-five percent of Texans uninsured.99 Estimates for Travis County
indicated that sixty-nine percent of patients were private or self-pay, with
only five percent on Medicaid.1"' Tarrant County estimates put private
coverage at sixty-two percent of the population and again, only five per-
cent on Medicaid, with twenty-three percent remaining uninsured. 1 1 In
stark contrast, El Paso County shows that only thirty-two percent of the
population has private coverage, sixteen percent of the population de-
pends on Medicaid for healthcare and thirty-five percent remain
uninsured.'0 2
Closely related to the payor-mix is the shortage of healthcare providers
in certain geographical areas. The fact remains that the border region has
lower numbers of healthcare providers in proportion to the population of
each respective city.'0 3 Examining the number of primary care physicians
in each county, Webb County only had 92 providers, El Paso County was
the second lowest at 308, Hidalgo County had 338, Travis County had
756, Tarrant County had 1,059, Bexar County had 1,093, Dallas County
had 1,838, and Harris County had 2,766 providers. 10 4 Yet, even still, an
analysis of the number of primary care physicians available for every
99. ELIZABETH DALTON, INST. FOR POL'Y & ECON. DEV., UNIV. OF TEX. AT EL
PASO, HEALTHCARE ACCESS ISSUES IN EL PASO COUNTY: A WORKING BLUEPRINT 4
chrt.1 (2002), http://iped.utep.edu/IPED%2OReports/2002_03PDF/report.pdf.
100. Id. at 4 chrt.2.
101. Id. at 5 chrt.3.
102. Id at 5 chrt.4.
103. Id. at 12 tbl.2.
104. DALTON, supra note 99, at 12 tbl.2
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100,000 persons further exemplifies the significance of the disparity. The
ratios of primary care physicians per 100,000 population by county are as
follows: El Paso 38.7, Webb 47.3, Hidalgo 59.8, Tarrant 66.8, Bexar 78.3,
Dallas 81.9, Harris 81.9, and Travis 114.3.105 The three counties with the
lowest physician-patient ratios are all located on the United States-Mex-
ico border.10
6
Reality dictates that certain geographical areas will always have a
higher number of patients dependent upon public healthcare coverage.
For that reason, the federal government established Disproportionate
Share Hospitals (DSH), which recognize and address those areas that re-
quire greater financial assistance. The majority of DSH patients fall
within the socio-economic status of low-income, thus the federal govern-
ment assists such hospitals to compensate for their loss of income by serv-
ing that population. 10 7 In Texas, there are three cities that have acquired
permanent DSH status: Galveston, Tyler, and Houston.10 8 The remain-
der of hospitals in the state must annually re-qualify for the extra assis-
tance.10 9 It is important to note that counties in the direst and most
severe of positions, resulting from high numbers of uninsured, high num-
bers of Medicaid recipients, and the lowest ratios of healthcare providers,
are denied permanent status as Disproportionate Share Hospitals.
The financial strain upon providers would not be as severe if the rate of
reimbursement was adequate and essentially equitable across the state.
The solution to the problem is equity and adequacy in the administration
of the Medicaid program. Thus, providers who are denied equal rates or
reimbursement are in the best position to assert the rights of their pa-
tients within the judicial system.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Irrespective of which cause of action is employed to sue the State of
Texas, courts should recognize and allow Medicaid beneficiaries' claims
to be brought by their physician-providers. A number of claims have
been previously explored in other notes and comments. The primary fo-
cus of this comment, however, is on a claim arising under the Equal Ac-
cess Clause of the Medicaid Act, specifically under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a
civil action for deprivation of rights under color of law. In fact, case law
determined by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has already recognized
that Medicaid beneficiaries have a private right of action under the
105. Id. at 12 tbl.2.
106. Id.
107. TEX. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. COMM'N, supra note 11, at G8.
108. Figueroa, supra note 20, at 61.
109. Id.
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Act.110 Courts, however, have not directly ruled on whether physician-
providers can assert a cause of action to sue in the capacity as next friend
of a Medicaid beneficiary against the Texas Department of Health and
Human Services Commission in order to enforce the Equal Access
Clause in the Medicaid Act. It should be noted, however, that several
cases have come within close proximity of specifying the scope of a physi-
cian's third-party standing in Medicaid cases.
Initially, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged physicians'
right to assert the rights of their patients in Singleton v. Wulff."' How-
ever, Singleton involved a right to privacy, specifically, a woman's right to
have an abortion. Third-party standing has yet to be extended to other
physician-patient relationships.
There is a split of authority among the Federal Circuit Courts as to
whether healthcare providers themselves have standing to sue state gov-
ernments. The First, 12 Sixth, 113 Eighth 1 4 and Tenth" 5 Circuit Courts
have ruled in favor of recognizing that providers have standing on behalf
of their patients. In contrast, the Third 1 6 and Fifth" 7 Circuit Courts ex-
pressly refused to acknowledge a provider's private right of action. In
Pennsylvania Pharmacists Association v. Houston,"8 the Third Circuit
ruled that pharmacists could not assert their own rights to enforce the
Medicaid Act." 9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ever-
green Presbyterian Ministries v. Hood, ruled that healthcare providers are
not entitled to sue in their own individual capacity, claiming their own
rights under the Medicaid Act. The court reasoned that Congress, in
passing the 1997 Balanced Budget Act and repealing the Boren Amend-
ment, discussed infra, did not intend for providers to be beneficiaries
under the Act.'12
Yet, the Evergreen court specifically held that the Act intended to pro-
vide coverage for Medicaid recipients, effectively limiting standing to
110. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000).
111. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (holding physicians stood in an intimate
relationship with the patient's right to have an abortion).
112. Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996).
113. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002).
114. Arkansas Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993); Pediatric Specialty
Care Inc. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Serv., 364 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2004).
115. Amisub, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Soc. Serv., 879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989).
116. Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the
Medicaid Act does not identify physicians as intended beneficiaries).
117. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000).
118. Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n, 283 F.3d 531 (3d Cir. 2002).
119. See generally Recent Case, Health Care Law - Medicaid - Third Circuit Finds
Providers Lack Standing To Enforce the Medicaid Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 969 (2003).
120. Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 929.
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beneficiaries and their individual entitlement to equal access to medical
care.121 Therefore, the specific question raised in this comment has yet to
be addressed by the courts.
A. The Boren Amendment.
Congress passed the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act in 1980,
transferring authority to ensure reimbursement to physician-providers
from the federal government to the state governments.' 22 State govern-
ments became responsible for ensuring compliance with federal standards
in the payment plan of administering the Medicaid Act within the
state.
123
While the intent of Congress was to remove federal oversight of state
payment plans, the effect was a shift of executive oversight to federal
judicial review.' 24 Previously, federal courts held that the Boren Amend-
ment specifically conferred enforceable rights to physician-providers, not
only to the Medicaid beneficiaries, and that the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 was the legal avenue through which enforcement was as-
serted.125 In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act effectively repealed the Bo-
ren Amendment as well as physician-providers' right to enforcement of
the Medicaid Act.126 Medicaid providers cannot sue under the Act to
enforce their own rights, however there has been no ruling specifically
prohibiting physicians to use their resources to assert the rights and
causes of action of patients.
B. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As a legal avenue through which enforcement of the Medicaid Act can
be asserted, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
121. Id. at 927.
122. See Harkins, supra note 24, at 159.
123. See id. at 169.
124. See id. at 178.
125. See id. at 179.
126. See id. at 159.
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granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable. 127
Section 1983 was first enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The controversy over the statute was whether or not the rights protected
in section 1983 were limited to constitutional violations. There was a split
among the justices as to whether or not the amended phrase "and laws"
was inclusive of statutory rights.128 Prior to 1980, section 1983 suits were
only permitted where there was a violation of a constitutionally protected
right.'29 Yet, in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,13 °
Justice Powell interpreted the language to mean "and laws providing for
equal rights.' 131 That interpretation effectively allowed section 1983 to
be utilized as an effective tool for the enforcement of entitlement pro-
grams. The controversy was finally decided in Maine v. Thiboutot,132
when the Court recognized the right of individuals to bring suit on statu-
tory claims.133
The Supreme Court's progression toward a narrow interpretation of
section 1983, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was discussed in great detail
by Bradford C. Mank in his article on the effects of Gonzaga University v.
Doe.' Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga,
plaintiffs frequently brought suit against state actors under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for inequitable and inadequate administration of federal spending
programs.' 35 Gonzaga effectively brought an end to such lawsuits by
shifting the burden of proof onto the private plaintiff to demonstrate
Congress' clear intent to allow for a private right of action. 36 The Su-
preme Court's opinion mandates that the plaintiff prove that the act
under which the claim is brought not only identifies the plaintiff as the
individual class to be directly benefited, but also that Congress intended
for the act to grant those beneficiaries specific, individual and enforceable
rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion states, "We made clear
that unless Congress 'speaks with a clear voice,' and manifests an 'unam-
biguous' intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions pro-
127. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
128. Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983: The Future After Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 39 Hous. L. REV. 1417, 1429 (2003).
129. Id. at 1427.
130. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
131. Mank, supra note 128, at 1429.
132. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
133. Mank, supra note 128, at 1430.
134. See generally id.
135. See id. at 1440, accord Figueroa, supra note 20, at 63.
136. Mank, supra note 128, at 1420.
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vide no basis for private enforcement by section 1983." 1 3 7 Even when a
federal act speaks directly to an identified class of beneficiaries, the Court
will refuse to find a basis for private enforcement when the act "[confers]
no specific, individually enforceable rights.'
138
A two part test was developed in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles,13 9 and later refined in Blessing v. Freestone'4 ° to assist
courts in determining whether federal rights are enforceable using section
1983.
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly [sic] protected by the statute is not so "vague and
amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the as-
serted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory,
terms.
141
The Blessing Court placed greater emphasis on the necessity of deter-
mining congressional intent. If the Court finds that Congress actually in-
tended to prohibit certain remedies, the case will nonetheless be
dismissed even where it has been proven that the federal statute created a
right. 14
2
One of the two exceptions to the Supreme Court's narrow view in
Blessing was the decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,4 3
which allowed a hospital district to successfully sue to force the state to
adopt "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement rates under section
1983.114 It is important to note that the Boren Amendment to the Medi-
caid Act was crucial to the Court's decision. As such, no similar decisions
have been handed down since the congressional repeal of the amend-
ment. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the Fifth Circuit has
already set forth the rights of Medicaid recipients using a three-step
standard.
137. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002).
138. Id. at 281.
139. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (creating a
two prong test for enforcement of rights through § 1983).
140. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
141. Id. at 340-41.
142. Id. at 341 (arguing for dismissal where Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy
under § 1983).
143. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
144. Id. at 524.
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C. Medicaid Suits in Texas
In Texas, Evergreen controls any inquiry into which actors have a pri-
vate right of action against the State of Texas for the enforcement of
rights through the Medicaid Act.'4 5 In Evergreen, two individual recipi-
ents and their provider nursing homes sued the State of Louisiana. While
the Evergreen court refused to find that the Medicaid Act directly bene-
fited healthcare providers, it specifically found that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(30)(A) was "'phrased in terms' benefitting [sic] recipients in
that it directly focuses on their access to medical care.' 146 The court
stated, "Indeed, section 30(A) speaks clearly in terms of the recipients
because 'care and services are [to be] available under the [state] plan at
least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general
population in the geographic area.'"147
Commentary distinguished older case law from current interpretation
on Medicaid cases based on the language in section 30(A) that does not
directly address costs to providers, but instead focuses on beneficiaries. 48
The Boren Amendment was crucial to previous suits because it included
language directly beneficial to healthcare providers; in its absence, courts
have refused to recognize a provider's right to assert a cause of action. 149
While the Evergreen holding was handed down before Gonzaga, it is
still good law in the Fifth Circuit. This is because similar language used in
the analysis mirrors the conclusion that Medicaid recipients have an indi-
vidual entitlement under section 1983, which affords them the right to
bring suit under the color of law statute.
The Evergreen court also examined the term "geographic area" and
stated, "we understand that the phrase 'geographic area' could have
many definitions depending upon the type of service or the needs of re-
cipients in a particular area."'5 ° The court's interpretation of "geo-
graphic area" appears to be amenable and flexible to the facts of each
case, since the definition of "geographic area" depends upon individual
"needs."
145. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 927.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A)).
148. Recent Case, supra note 119, at 971-72.
149. See Meredith Warner Nissen, Issues in the Third Circuit: Pharmacists Without
Remedies Means Serious Side Effects for Patients: Third Circuit Denies Pennsylvania Phar-
macists Standing to Challenge Reimbursement Rates Under the Medicaid Act, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1377, 1382 (2003).
150. Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 931.
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D. The Physician Exception to Third-Party Suits
No court has yet recognized third-party standing for physician-provid-
ers to enforce the Medicaid Act. There are only a few instances where
the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of third-party standing.
15 1
The United States Supreme Court extended third-party standing to physi-
cian-providers, but only in abortion cases where a woman's right to
choose was affected.
Undeniably, standing is a fundamental concern of each case, as courts
will not address the merits of any controversy until standing has been
properly asserted and established.15 2 Furthermore, on a motion to dis-
miss for want of standing, trial courts and appellate courts are required to
construe the allegations and the complaint itself in a light most favorable
to the complaining party.1 53 "At the same time, it is within the trial
court's power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment
to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact
deemed supportive of the plaintiff's standing."' 5 4 In light of these hold-
ings, the issue of standing is determined in a case-specific fact inquiry. As
long as the physician-provider, as the plaintiff, can substantiate and sat-
isfy the requirements of standing, the suit should proceed to the merits of
the case. In cases challenging the Medicaid Act, the physician-provider
can overcome that burden.
According to the resources and information available, physician-prov-
iders are in a much better position than Medicaid patients to sue for en-
forcement of the Medicaid Act. 5 5 The relationship that exists between
physician-providers and Medicaid beneficiaries is close enough that any
extension of third-party status upon physician-providers for the enforce-
ment of the Medicaid Act is not only probable, but logical.
The Supreme Court enumerated two reasons for disfavoring suits
brought by parties who are "next friends" of those whose rights are being
asserted.' 56 The Court articulated the general rule in Singleton v.
Wulff,157 "[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindi-
151. See David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Requirements of Article III of Federal Constitu-
tion as Affecting Standing to Challenge Particular Conduct as Violative of Federal Law -
Supreme Court Cases, 70 L. Ed. 2d 941, 961-63 (1983 & Supp. 2004).
152. See id. at 946 ("The Supreme Court has also held that it is obliged as a matter of
the 'case or controversy' requirement associated with Article III of the Constitution, in
reviewing a decision of a federal district court, to examine the standing of the parties even
if the issue of standing is not raised by the parties themselves.").
153. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see also Oliveiri, supra note 151, at 946.
154. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
155. Recent Case, supra note 119, at 970.
156. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976).
157. Singleton, 428 U.S. 106.
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cate the constitutional rights of some third party.' 158 First, the court be-
lieves that those who hold a right to sue may not "wish to assert them, or
will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not." Second, the party asserting the rights of another will
be a better and most effective advocate of their own rights.'59
However, there are cases in which the Supreme Court acknowledged a
physician's right to assert a claim on behalf of his or her patients. 160 Even
though the facts specific to such cases have only involved reproductive
rights, the court's analysis focused upon the injury directly caused upon
the physician. Therefore, the main argument of this comment finds sup-
port in the fact that the Court allows third-party standing because of the
nature of the physician-patient relationship.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit directly ruled
upon third-party standing in favor of the physician provider in Okpalobi
v. Foster.1 6 1 Citing Singleton v. Wulff, the Okpalobi court noted two pre-
liminary requirements to establish standing: injury in fact; and standing to
enforce their patients' constitutional rights. 62
Okpalobi restated the three elements which plaintiffs must allege: "(1)
an injury that is concrete, particularized and actual or imminent; (2) a
causal connection between the alleged injury and the defendant's con-
duct; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the in-
jury. ,163 At the same time, the court acknowledged the well-established
law that a claim of "direct economic harm," specifically to physicians who
perform abortions, satisfied this requirement. 64
Then, the court turned to an analysis of third-party standing, and recog-
nized that the Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule
disfavoring third party plaintiffs in circumstances of physicians asserting
the reproductive rights of their patients. 65 Utilizing the framework es-
tablished in Singleton, this examination required the presence of two ele-
ments. The first element involved the consideration of the relationship
between the litigant and the person whose rights were being asserted.
Analysis of the first element was explained by the court:
If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activ-
ity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at least can be sure that its
158. Id. at 114 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)).
159. Id.
160. Oliveiri, supra note 151, at 961-63.
161. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 350-51.
163. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 350.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 351 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976)).
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construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that the
right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit. 166
Next, the court looked to whether there existed "some genuine obstacle
preventing the third party from asserting her own rights., 167 The simple
fact that patients are enrolled in the Medicaid program demonstrates a
lack of resources to receive basic healthcare. Logically, these patients
have a substantial obstacle to access legal representation to assert their
rights.1 68
In Diamond v. Charles,169 the Supreme Court articulated that a pro-
vider who shows that "funding regulations have a direct financial impact
on his practice may assert the constitutional rights of other individuals
who are unable to assert those rights themselves.' 170 The Court, how-
ever, rejected the argument in Diamond because of the speculative na-
ture of the pediatrician's claim that enforcement of abortion laws would
increase his patient population. In effect, the Court noted that in order to
recover, the party must have sustained a "concrete injury" in order to
distinguish between a party with an interest in the "direct outcome of a
litigation" rather than a party "with a mere interest in the problem."''
While this comment acknowledges the important differences between a
woman's right to have an abortion and an indigent person's access to
healthcare, both individuals possess the right of confidentiality within the
patient-physician relationship. The Fifth Circuit opinion compared the
provider in Okpalobi to the provider in Singleton and determined that the
lack of distinction between the two could only allow a logical conclusion
to grant standing in that case.' 72 Emphasis was placed upon the relation-
ship of the patient-provider, and the decision was handed down on
grounds that the patient could not assert his or her constitutional right
without the assistance of his or her physician.' 73 Such a conclusion pro-
vides the best argument for a physician-provider's assertion of rights of
Medicaid beneficiaries.
The federal legislature has bestowed an entitlement to indigent persons
to receive medical care. That same right has been recognized by the Fifth
Circuit, applying the Supreme Court's standard, when the Fifth Circuit
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Fresithler, supra note 41, at 1415-16 (explaining the indigent face a height-
ened difficulty to pay for legal fees).
169. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
170. Id. at 65-66 (rejecting the claim of the physician who claims interest in his status
as a doctor because the relationship to his patients were too attenuated and speculative).
171. Id. at 66-67 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
172. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 351.
173. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976).
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explicitly held that the Medicaid Act designates that the enrollees, and
not the physicians, are the intended beneficiaries of the program. The
court specifically determined that Congressional intent granted benefi-
ciaries the right to enforce the Medicaid Act through section 1983.'74
Furthermore, Medicaid patients rely and depend upon the discretion of
physician-providers to facilitate their right to receive medical attention.
Therefore, logical progression leads to the conclusion that physicians also
have third-party standing to assert the rights of Medicaid beneficiaries,
just as they have been allowed to assert the rights of their female patients
seeking reproductive freedom.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The greatest loss is placed upon the shoulders of the indigent of this
nation. The recent budget cuts made by the Texas Legislature impact
children more than any other class of persons. 17 5 This pattern of cost-
saving techniques is disheartening, especially in light of the fact that while
children make up the largest portion of Medicaid enrollees, they only
comprise a mere nineteen percent of total expenditures.' 76 The indigent
and the children of this nation are the ultimate losers in the budgetary
games played by the legislature, notwithstanding the fact that they are the
very people the Medicaid Act was designed to protect. When the State of
Texas inequitably administers the Medicaid program and further reduces
budgetary appropriations, the state effectively reduces the number of
physician-providers attending the indigent sick, and denies Medicaid ben-
eficiaries medical care. The ultimate result is a system engendered to
withhold healthcare services and prevent the enforcement of the entitle-
ment program by limiting the scope of the indigent's cause of action. The
Fifth Circuit dissolved a legal remedy previously-afforded to the physi-
cian-providers, who are best equipped to enforce the Act through the
judiciary.
While Medicaid recipients are afforded the right to bring a cause of
action on their own, it is very unlikely a suit will be filed. Although the
right to enforce the Medicaid Act is available, it is an unlikely solution for
recipients who lack legal resources to utilize judicial remedies. Individu-
als who qualify for Medicaid do so because they have no resources to
access medical attention; it is logical to conclude that they also lack re-
sources to access the courts. However, an alternative that would give a
174. Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 351.
175. See generally, DUNKELBERG & O'MALLEY, supra note 67, at 6; HILL, supra note
8.
176. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 27, at
tbl."Medicaid Enrollment vs. Spending".
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voice to the voiceless is available: allowing physician-providers to sue on
behalf of their Medicaid eligible patients.
As stated earlier, the courts have already recognized third-party stand-
ing for physicians in abortion rights causes of action. The courts should
now recognize the same relationship between physicians and their Medi-
caid patients. The two relationships parallel each other in that both clas-
ses of patients seek to exercise a right and both stand in a dependent
position upon their physician to exercise that right for them. Moreover,
this comment demonstrates the existence of an injury to Medicaid physi-
cian-providers as well. These physicians have a direct stake in the litiga-
tion; for without equitable reimbursement, financial failure is certain.
Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates a causal relationship between
the inevitable injury suffered by Medicaid physician-providers and the
denial of equitable reimbursement rates. Should the courts simply rule in
favor of enforcement of the Equal Access Clause of the Medicaid Act,
the physician-providers would be afforded a legal remedy for the unfair
and inequitable administration of the Medicaid Act.
Therefore, it follows from this analysis that the law should extend
third-party standing to healthcare providers whom Medicaid recipients
depend upon, to stand in place of the recipients asserting their rights to
enforce the Medicaid Act.
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